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Legal Struggles and Political Mobilization around Gender Quotas 
 
This paper is part of a case study series stemming from a project, “Gender quotas in Europe: Towards 
European Parity Citizenship?" funded by the European University Institute Research Council and Jean 
Monnet Life Long Learning Programme under the scientific coordination of Professors Ruth Rubio-
Marín and Eléonore Lépinard. Gender quotas are part of a global trend to improve women’s 
representation in decision-making bodies. In the past decade they have often been extended in terms of 
the numbers to be reached (40 or 50% instead of 30%), and in terms of the social field they should 
apply to (from politics to the economy to the administration). The aim of the project is to assess and 
analyse this global trend in the European context, comparing the adoption (or resistance to) gender 
quotas in 13 European countries in the fields of electoral politics, corporate boards and public bodies.  
The case-studies in this series consider the legal struggles and political mobilization around Gender 
Quotas in Austria, Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, 
Spain, Sweden, and the U.K. They were presented and discussed in earlier versions at a workshop held 
in September 2014 at the EUI.  Based on the workshop method, all working papers have reflected on 
similar aspects raised by their country case, concerning: 1) domestic/national preconditions and 
processes of adoption of gender quotas; 2) transnational factors; 3) legal and constitutional challenges 
raised by gender quotas in both the political and economic spheres; and 4) new frontiers in the field.  
The working papers will be also made available on the blog of the workshop, where additional 
information on the experts and country information sheets can be found, and new developments can be 
shared. https://blogs.eui.eu/genderquotas. 
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Abstract 
Once a country allergic to any type of preferential treatment or quota measure for women, France has 
become a country that applies gender quotas to regulate women’s presence and representation in 
politics, the business sector, public bodies, public administration and even some civil society 
organizations. This article focuses on the process by which, after constitutional battles, the principle of 
‘equal access of women and men’ to decision-making bodies was entrenched in the French 
constitution, and how the institutions created to monitor its implementation provided a support 
structure for the extension and diffusion of gender quotas from electoral politics to other domains. In a 
final section the paper assess the strength and weaknesses of the tool of gender quotas in the French 
context and delineate the factors that can sustain or impede quotas’ effectiveness. 
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 1 
Introduction 
Once a country allergic to any policy that would look like affirmative action for women or any other 
social group, let alone quotas with fixed targets, France has transformed in less than a decade (2006-
2014) in the land of gender quotas. Since the adoption of the last round of gender equality measures 
under the socialist government and parliamentary majority – the Vallaud-Belkacem bill on ‘real 
equality’ adopted on July 23rd 2014 – gender quotas are now the rule in universities juries, hospital’s 
higher civil servants, ministry’s staffs, corporate boards of medium and large firms, supervisory 
boards of public institutions, professional organizations, sports federations, regional socio-economic 
councils and, last but not least, most of elected political bodies. How has such a change been made 
possible?  
When the debate on gender parity in politics appeared on the French public scene in the mid-1990s, 
the word ‘quota’ itself was taboo. Activists were going to great lengths to deny accusation of special 
treatment for women or of positive action
1
 and the very idea of a fixed number target to attain was 
dismissed as un-republican, un-French and contradictory with the principle of equality. Today the 
picture is exactly the opposite. In successive waves of legal reforms the French Parliament has adopted 
numerous measures that use specific targets (in general a 40% quota) to impose women’s presence in 
many decision-making bodies or functions that organize social, economic and political life. This 
drastic reversal was not completed without a fight. Many on the right wing of the political landscape 
as well as representatives of employers tried to resist the diffusion of gender quota mechanisms in 
social and economic life. However, the fight was more easily won this time around: the epic struggle 
for political parity that took place in 1999 and 2000 had definitely shaken and shifted the ground upon 
which political and social actors had to fight subsequently. 
This paper aims at retracing the process by which France has become the land of gender quotas, and 
the factors that may account for this unlikely outcome. In particular, what is striking in the French case 
is 1/ how gender quotas first presented as ‘anti-French’ are now considered the French preferred tool 
in the current policy toolbox to redress gender inequalities, and 2/ how the process of adopting gender 
quotas as issues has become endogenous to the policy-making process. Once a measure depicted as a 
foreign import, hotly debated in the public sphere and adopted thanks to pressure from civil society, 
gender quotas have become a legitimate and ‘obvious’ means to redress gender imbalance, and 
consequently receded at the margins of the public debate. Although it is not yet possible to assess if 
France is a case of success story for gender quotas and/or to evaluate their transformative potentials 
for gender relations in all spheres of social and economic life, the process by which gender quotas 
have become mainstream is in itself worth scrutinizing, in particular in comparative perspective with 
other European countries. Indeed, it calls attention to the enabling factors that might be elaborated in a 
context once adversarial to quotas.  
Inventing Parity (1989-2006): Breaking the Rules and Overcoming Constitutional 
Opposition 
The story of gender quotas in France goes back several decades and is full of unexpected 
developments, surprising twists and epic battles. However, what is striking is that since 1982, when 
the first gender quota bill was introduced, the grounds upon which social and political actors debate 
this issue has radically shifted. The initial, deeply rooted constitutional resistance to quotas expressed 
by male politicians as well as by the political and judicial elite and constitutional judges has faded. 
                                                     
1 Its detractors refered to these measures  at the time (and still today) as ‘positive discrimination’, then this term became the 
usual way to name these measures in the public debate. The use of the term ‘discrimination’ aimed of course at 
discrediting any attempt at implementing positive action measures in favor of any group. 
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Highly principled legal and political arguments against quotas, invoking the indivisibility of the 
Republic, equality and democratic freedom have disappeared and left room for more pragmatic 
assessments about the need to improve women’s presence in decision-making bodies and all spheres 
of social life.  This would not have been made possible without strong mobilization from civil society 
and, later on, the institutionalization of parity. This section details these processes and their impact on 
the legitimization and further implementation of gender quotas in France. 
Mobilizing Civil Society and European Norms 
The history of the adoption of legislative gender quotas in France is now well documented (Alwood 
and Wadia 2000, Bereni and Lépinard 2004, Bereni and Revillard 2007, Krook 2009, Lépinard 2007, 
Murray 2010, Oppello 2006, Scott 2005) The initial 1982 decision of the French Constitutional 
Council to declare unconstitutional the provision of a bill proposing a 25% quota of women on 
candidate lists for municipal elections
2
 framed the subsequent public debate on this issue for two 
decades. Indeed, the Constitutional Council’s (hereafter CC) decision argued its refusal of quotas on 
highly principled grounds invoking two Constitutional principles: the indivisibility of the sovereignty 
of the people and the equality principle. The use of a quota was perceived as dividing the people in 
different groups (men and women) and therefore incompatible with the idea that the French people is 
undividable and exercises its sovereignty through its representatives in a non-divided way. Secondly 
the quota was perceived as going against the meritocratic element present in all election and against 
the principle of equality as applied to electoral candidates. When the debate resurfaced in the 
beginning of the 1990s, in part thanks to the European network of experts on gender balance in 
decision-making (Bereni 2004, Lépinard 2007) and to the influence of international norms following 
the Beijing conference, French parity activists faced tremendous opposition as their detractors used the 
CC’s argument that a quota in political representation was unconstitutional and un-Republican because 
it meant acknowledging the existence of social ‘groups’ rather than an undivided French people.  
The context and factors that helped reverse the situation are now well-known. First, the bicentenary of 
the French revolution led to the publication of various historical accounts of French women’s 
exclusion from the political sphere, and feminist academics, historians and philosophers, brought a 
new expertise and a new critique of French supposed universalism. In 1992 the publication of the book 
Au pouvoir citoyennes! Liberté, Egalité, Parité by female politician/academic and journalists François 
Gaspard, Claude Servan-Schreiber and Anne Le Gall represented a moment of crystallization of this 
new claim and gave it a clear name: parity. Second, at the beginning of the 1990s, female politicians 
from the Left who found out their party was hostile to women and inimical to the idea of voluntary 
quotas, and feminist activists from reformist organizations networked and coalesced around the idea of 
parity, rather than quotas. While the (weak) institutions of state feminism had not really placed the 
issue of women’s political representation on the agenda since their creation in the mid-1970s, 
preferring to focus on equal pay and female work (Bereni and Revillard 2007), several reformist 
organizations (created during the first and the second wave of the feminist movement) had always kept 
an interest for the topic and they decided to join their effort and focus on the single issue of parity in 
1992 under the umbrella of a new organization, Elles Aussi. Other organizations focusing exclusively 
on parity were created in the mid-1990s as well, and important second wave organizations, such as 
Choisir-La cause des femmes, led by activist Gisèle Halimi, also concentrated their efforts on this new 
claim. 
Third, some of these women who organized in networks during the 1990s became active members of 
the European expert network on gender-balance in decision-making (Bereni 2004). This participation 
gave them expertise and legitimacy and the ability to compare France with other European countries. 
Using a shaming strategy, France was from then on labeled as the ‘red lantern’ of Europe. 
                                                     
2 Decision n° 82 146 DC 18 November 1982. 
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The political opportunity structure in France is very much determined by presidential elections. Using 
this window of opportunity parity activists asked presidential candidates to take position on the parity 
issue during the 1995 campaign. This led the newly elected president from right wing party RPR 
Jacques Chirac to create a small governmental institution, the Observatory of Parity, to give expertise 
and advice on this topic to the government. Key female politicians and feminist activists, appointed in 
1995 by the right wing government to the newly created Observatory of Parity helped keep the debate 
alive and produced the first official report devoted to the issue of parity (Halimi 1998). Finally when 
the socialist Party unexpectedly came back to power in 1997, it was bound to take more seriously than 
its right wing counterpart its commitment to gender equality and the moment was finally ripe for a 
revision of the Constitution in order to unlock the 15-years constitutional freeze on quotas.  
However, despite a favorable momentum, the battle was hard won, especially in the parliamentary and 
public arenas. Parity was presented as opening the door to US-style identity politics and all the usual 
rationales against quota (un-meritocratic, against freedom to stand for election, the absence of 
competent women or women’s disinterest for politics) were abundantly used. Right wing 
parliamentary representatives strongly voiced their opposition, reaffirmed traditional gender 
stereotypes and claimed that a natural social process would enable women to enter political assemblies 
in the years to come, while left-wing representatives used every argument possible, from equality 
principles to pragmatic accounts of a supposed complementarity between men and women in decision-
making bodies, to plead their case. The presence of a left wing majority in the Assembly and the 
Senate, and the personal support of the Prime Minister Lionel Jospin to the cause, as well as the 
feminist expertise gathered under the supervision of the Observatory of Parity sealed the victorious 
fate of the reform i.e. the possibility to reach a majority of the 3/5 of both legislative chambers for a 
Constitutional Revision.  
What was gained from the Constitutional revision? Article 3 of the Constitution was changed to 
include the following sentence:
3
 ‘the law promotes women’s and men’s equal access to electoral 
mandates and elective functions’. The placement of this sentence in Article 3 that defines national 
sovereignty is a direct consequence of, and a direct response to, the framing of the debate by the 
Constitutional Council in terms of sovereignty. A revision to article 4 adds that political parties must 
contribute to this objective. In 2000 a law defined more precisely the parameters of the 
implementation of this new constitutional principle.
4
 The debate was, again, heated in the Parliament 
with right wing deputies trying to curtail every innovation introduced by the reform, with the tacit 
agreement of many left-wing deputies. For example, despite intense controversy the attempt to 
implement parity in cities over 2500 inhabitants did not pass
5
. Parity was implemented only in cities 
over 3500 inhabitants where elections follow a closed proportional list system. As a result the electoral 
system was not challenged at all, despite being inimical to the implementation of gender quotas with 
several elections using uninominal/majoritarian modes of elections. Only elections to the Senate were 
modified to allow more senatorial districts to use a proportional list system (all districts with 3 
senators at least instead of 5).
6
 
The Fight of the Constitutional Council against Gender Quotas 
In 2005 the then Minister for parity and gender equality at work, Nicole Ameline, proposed a bill on 
égalité professionnelle, that is equal pay and gender equality at work.
7
 Building up on the 2001 parity 
victory (a victory Nicole Ameline had supported) the bill mentioned women’s presence on board and 
                                                     
3 Loi constitutionnelle no 99-569 of 8 July 1999 relative à l'égalité entre les femmes et les hommes. 
4 Loi n° 2000-493 of 6 June 2000. 
5 Cities under 3500 inhabitants have an open proportional list system. 
6 Loi n° 2000-641 of 10 July 2000.  
7 Projet de loi 2214, enregistré 24 March 2005. 
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the need to reach a gender balance within a 5 years period, but did not say how. Marie-Jo 
Zimmermann proposed several amendments to the bill to include a limit of 80% of members of the 
same sex on corporate boards, which means effectively a 20% women quota for boards as well as 
commissions representing workers in the public sector and supervisory boards of public institutions. 
The gender gap was to be reduced within 5 years, however the bill and the law finally adopted 
(including Zimmermann’s 20% quotas) did not define any sanction for non-compliance. Despite an 
agreement reached in the National Assembly and the Senate on the use of a 20% quota
8
, the 
Constitutional Council struck down the quota provision. Indeed, 60 deputies referred the law to the CC 
on procedural grounds (they did not mention the quota provision), but the CC decided to examine the 
quota provision and, unsurprisingly given its historical commitment against quotas, struck down the 
provision.
9
 A Constitutional reform was, once again, needed to implement this new type of quota. 
It has become apparent, from the history of gender quotas that the Constitutional Council has proven a 
site of entrenched resistance to the demands to reformulate the republican principle of formal equality. 
In 1982 and 2006 the CC refused that gender quotas be implemented and struck down laws aiming at 
improving women’s presence in decision-making bodies. Each time the CC was not seized by deputies 
to examine gender quotas provisions but did so nonetheless (it used its power to seize itself), thereby 
demonstrating its will to be the one in charge of defining the meaning of equality and its lawful means 
of implementation. Each time the CC decision determined the subsequent path for legal reform, that is 
a constitutional revision, encouraging parity activists in response to make stronger claims about what 
gender equality means and the means that can be used to achieve it, and, in fact, led to stronger quotas 
(with higher numerical aims and stronger sanctions). Whereas in 1982 the CC was adamant that 
political quotas would threaten the indivisibility of national sovereignty, in 2006 its legal reasoning 
used an equality argument to strike down CBQ. However, the content of the equality principle 
defended by the CC in 2006, in a context in which a constitutional revision has already allowed the 
legislator to use quotas, is particularly shallow. Indeed, in its decision 
10
the CC argued that the aim of 
a gender balance in non-political instances was not unconstitutional (how could it be otherwise since 
the constitution had been revised to make it so?), but that the legislator could not give priority to 
gender (sex in the CC’s wording) over competence or merit, thereby implying that the proposed 20% 
gender quota on CBQ logically implied that incompetent women would be nominated on boards.
11
 The 
thrust of the argument was that sex could not be a lawful, compulsory criterion to choose board 
members. However, why this could not be so was not really explained in the decision since the 
constitutional judge does not make any reference to constitutional texts or norms when s/he states this 
specific argument (§15 and 16). Hence, equality is invoked as the normative and legal ground upon 
which gender quotas are rejected, but its content and definition are not explained. 
Hence, on both occasions the CC used normative and authoritative arguments (sovereignty and 
equality) to reject gender quotas, but without really giving precise and solid legal grounds to its 
decision. Rather, it used its political clout and institutional privileged position to promote a formal 
conception of equality. Indeed, these decisions on gender quotas must be placed into the context of 
CC’s attempts at defending republican values in the face of what it interpreted as communautarian 
threats in the 1990s. Indeed, on two important occasions, the CC linked together the principle of 
indivisibility of the Republic, national sovereignty and equality to strike down what it perceived as 
separatist claims (for Corsica)
12
 or provisions giving special treatment to groups in a way that would 
                                                     
8 Loi n° 2006-340 of 23 March 2006 relative à l'égalité salariale entre les femmes et les hommes. 
9 I detail below the legal argument used by the CC to strike down CBQ. 
10 Décision n° 2006-533 DC of 16 March 2006 
11 « Considérant que, si la recherche d'un accès équilibré des femmes et des hommes aux responsabilités autres que les 
fonctions politiques électives n'est pas contraire aux exigences constitutionnelles rappelées ci-dessus, elle ne saurait, 
sans les méconnaître, faire prévaloir la considération du sexe sur celle des capacités et de l'utilité commune ». 
12 Décision 91-290 DC of  9 May 1991. 
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foster their separatism and imply a differential treatment with other groups (language rights for 
regions)
13
 (Calves 2002). In 1999 in particular, the CC rejected the ratification of the European Charter 
of regional languages arguing that the constitutional principle of the indivisibility of the French people 
implies that it is forbidden to recognize “collective rights, for any kind of groups defined on the basis 
of their community of origin, their culture their language or their belief”.14 Several years later, in 2007, 
the CC again used its power to self-examine provisions of a bill that have not been submitted to its 
scrutiny by parliamentarians to struck down a provision enabling the collection of statistical data 
referring to peoples’ origins or ethnicity on similar grounds (Sabbagh and Peer 2008).15  
Hence, the CC decision on gender quotas must be understood in the broader legal and political 
context, a context in which the CC fought to impose a conception of the non-discrimination principle - 
that appears in Article 1 of the Constitution
16
 - as a principle of non-distinction, i.e. a principle of 
color-blindness. Since the CC was determined to refuse specific rights to any groups based on 
ethnicity, origin or language, it also considered gender as a ‘dividing’ social characteristic that should 
not lead to positive action measures.  
The dominant narrative of the 1999 Constitutional reform and the subsequent 2000 law imposing 
parity in several elections is one of breaking the rule and trying to impose a new one. Indeed, 
opposition to parity was voiced in the name of preserving the integrity of Republican constitutional 
principles, including the principle of equality itself (Rodriguez Ruiz and Rubio Marin 2008). In order 
to counter such a powerful normative argument, parity activists had to place their claim on high 
normative grounds as well. Hence, rather than explaining the use of quota as a temporary measure in 
order to achieve a concrete pragmatic goal – women’s access to politics – they framed parity as a 
democratic normative principle that would ensure not only women’s fair political representation but 
also a better and more modern democracy because both components of human kind, men and women, 
would be present (Lépinard 2007, 2013). Hence the context of the debate forced activists to define 
parity as a normative principle, and a new rule for political representation. It was out of the question 
that parity would be a temporary measure. Quite the contrary it was always framed as a principle with 
no term limit. Moreover, although the focus of intense activism and claim making was the political 
sphere, some activists already pointed in 1995 that the principle could apply in other spheres of social 
life. Hence, although the focus had been clearly to ‘improve’ and ‘perfect’ French democracy by 
adding to it the principle of parity, this principle was here to stay and could expand outside the realm 
of politics. In fact, parity represented an opportunity to reframe demands for gender equality, to claim 
new measures for women’s rights. The semantic change, from equality to parity – made necessary by 
the strong opposition to quota in the name of equality – actually opened up new venues to elaborate 
new claims (Lépinard 2007). 
Institutionalizing Parity: the creation of a support structure (1995-2014) 
In the decade following the victorious campaign for the constitutional revision, the principle of parity 
became a new way to frame demands for equality, and was more clearly adopted by femocrats and 
French state feminism as a part of their toolkit or ‘grammar’ for action (Bereni and Revillard 2007). 
                                                     
13 Décision 99-412 DC of 15 June 1999. 
14 «Considérant que ces principes fondamentaux s'opposent à ce que soient reconnus des droits collectifs à quelque groupe 
que ce soit, défini par une communauté d'origine, de culture, de langue ou de croyance» (§6, Décision 99-412 DC  
of 15 June 1999). 
15 Décision n° 2007-557 DC of 15 November 2007.  
16 France is an undividable, secular, democratic and social Republic. It guarantees equality of all citizens without distinctions 
based on origin, race or religion.«La France est une République indivisible, laïque, démocratique et sociale. Elle assure 
l'égalité devant la loi de tous les citoyens sans distinction d'origine, de race ou de religion.» 
Eléonore Lépinard 
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This adoption of the parity motto was made possible by the creation of a strong support structure
17
 
(Epp 1998) in favor of parity and by the political activism of key players.  
The incremental strengthening of political parity 
Indeed, the Observatory of Parity became the official monitoring body for the implementation of the 
parity law, compiling data and producing expertise after each round of elections on how to improve 
the parity laws and their implementation. Its activism was supported by the creation in 1999 of two 
delegations for women’s rights, one in the Senate and one in the Assembly. Marie-Jo Zimmerman, a 
right-wing deputy close to President Chirac –who was reelected in 2002 –was appointed as General 
Rapporteure of the Observatory and President of the National Assembly’s delegation for women’s 
rights. Her commitment to women’s rights and to the parity principle led her to issue very critical 
reports on the implementation of parity, especially by her own political party, and very critical reports 
on various reforms of the electoral system proposed by President Sarkozy. Indeed, the right wing 
majority passed electoral reforms in 2003 which direct effect was to reduce the scope of the parity 
laws for senatorial, regional and European elections. Indeed, while deputies introduced a strict ‘zipper’ 
system for candidate lists for senators elected with a proportional representation system, it reduced the 
number of senators elected with such a system: the proportional election with list system applied to all 
circumscriptions (départements) with at least 3 senators and now applied only to (fewer) départements 
with 4 senators.
18
 Similarly, the government and its parliamentary majority introduced smaller districts 
for both European and regional elections, with the predictable effect of limiting the impact of the 
parity requirement.
19
  
However, parity activist inside political institutions did not witness those attempts to curb the parity 
reform and its disappointing implementation for the National Assembly (elected with a uninominal 
system) without taking action. Quite the contrary, under the tenure of Marie-Jo Zimmermann, from 
2002 to 2009, the Observatory helped craft several pieces of legislations to improve the efficacy of the 
parity laws. In 2007 a law to promote women’s and men’s equal access to electoral mandate and 
elective functions
20
 was passed. It extended parity to executive functions in regional and municipal 
councils (in cities over 3500 inhabitants). Indeed, so far parity applied only to candidate lists, and left 
untouched executive functions. Traditionally the head of the list would designate a number of elected 
candidates to be part of the executive body of the city or the regional council, and the regional or 
municipal council would vote in favor when meeting for the first time of its tenure. Hence, there was 
no obligation to respect parity in allocating the, crucial, executive functions. The 2007 law imposed 
parity in executive functions and increased the financial penalty for political parties that would not 
apply parity for legislative elections. Finally, this law also imposed a ‘mix ticket’ for uninominal 
elections (legislative and cantonales): the substitute should be of the opposite sex of the candidate.  
Although only one bill was passed, many others were proposed, and short lived, to improve the 
implementation of parity in election. For example on May 20th 2010, the then General Rapporteure of 
the Observatoire, Chantal Brunel, proposed a bill (n°2529) to ‘promote women’s and men’s equal 
access to electoral mandates with a uninominal majoritarian mode of election’. These failed attempts 
testify of the continuing activism on the issue of political parity inside governmental and legislative 
institutions. Moreover, on the ground, activists networks such as Elles Aussi continued to lobby, to 
issue press releases, to organize conferences and training session for female representatives.  
                                                     
17 Charles Epp uses the term support structure to designate a combination of several institutional and legal factors that sustain 
the development of human rights and what he calls the ‘rights revolution’. I borrow the term to designate the institutional 
appartus that supported the development of the parity claim. 
18 Loi n° 2003-697 of 30 July 2003. 
19 Loi n° 2003-327 of 11 April 2003. 
20 Loi n° 2007-128 of 31 January 2007 
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As the socialists came back to power in 2012 some electoral reforms called for by parity activists for a 
long time finally took shape. In 2013 an electoral law
21
 changed the way local counselors (conseillers 
départementaux) are elected (introducing a ‘mix ticket’ one man/one woman) and aligning cities over 
1000 inhabitants on the same mode of election (proportional list system as cities over 3500 
inhabitants, allowing a strict parity to be applied to candidate lists (a reform asked by parity activists 
as early as 1999). Another electoral law re-introduced proportional list system to elect senators in 
districts with 3 or more senators.
22
 Finally in 2014 an important piece of legislation tightened the 
condition for elected representatives to hold several mandates at the same time. For a long time parity 
activists had identified holding several mandates, a common practice in French politics, as an 
important impediment for women’s access and presence in political assemblies since men were 
trusting most of the available mandates. This new law prevents national and European deputies, as 
well as senators to hold another executive mandate at the local level.
23
 
During all these legislative processes the support structure institutionalizing parity was a key actor, 
issuing reports on how parity was implemented and pointing to loopholes and problems in the current 
legislation. Another interesting way in which the Observatory of Parity tried to prevent setbacks in the 
implementation of the parity laws was by providing prospective knowledge on how certain changes in 
the electoral system would adversarially affect the representation of women. For example, when 
Nicolas Sarkozy, then President of the Republic, proposed a bill in 2011 to suppress two important 
local elective mandates (local counselors and regional counselors) and blend them into only one 
mandate of ‘territorial counselors’ mostly elected through uninominal majority system (rather than 
proportional list system), the Observatory provided an assessment of the number of women that would 
probably be elected under such a new electoral system, showing how women’s presence would 
drastically decrease. It provided these numbers for each French department, comparing each time with 
the current number of elected women.
24
 
The institutionalization of parity finally led to two rounds of institutional change within French state 
feminism institutions. Indeed, the creation in 1995 of the Observatory of Parity meant that the issue of 
women’s political representation was clearly identified as specific and was not articulated with other 
women’s rights issues inside French state feminism (Baudino 2005). Although the Observatory’s 
official missions were broadly defined to include the political, social and economic situation of 
women, it in fact devoted itself uniquely to producing data and expertise on women’s political 
representation. The ‘service des droits des femmes’ is traditionally in France the bureaucratic structure 
in charge of women’s rights25. Hence there was a strict separation between the two institutions and the 
Observatory had stronger links with the legislative delegations for women’s rights given the fact that 
for a long period (2002-2009) Marie-Jo Zimmermann headed both structures. Things changed in 2013 
when socialist President François Hollande created the Haut Conseil à l’égalité entre les femmes et les 
hommes, (High Council for Equality between women and men – HCEfh). Still a parallel structure to 
the administrative bureaucracy in charge of women’s rights, the HCEfh has broader mission, and an 
extended staff
26
 compared to the previous Observatory. Among its members are high civil servants in 
charge of gender equality in each ministry, as a way to mainstream gender equality in the executive 
                                                     
21 Loi n° 2013-403 of 17 May 2013 
22 Loi n° 2013-702 of 2 August 2013 
23 Loi organique of 14 février 2014. 
24 Observatoire de la Parité entre les femmes et les hommes, étude d’impact 2014, accessed online http://www.haut-conseil-
egalite.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/OPFH_RT2014_projectionsratios.pdf. 
25 Provided with a specific political leadership such as a minister or an under-secretary of State depending on the government 
in power, socialist tending to provide women’s rights with a specific ministerial portfolio when right wing government 
tended to subsume it under social affairs 
26 Although still minimalist : now three full time persons are employed rather than two for the Observatory. The members are 
more numerous : over 70 when the Observatory had only less than 40. 
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bureaucracy. Moreover, the HCEfh has a new mission, compared to the Observatory, which is to 
provide impact studies on pieces of legislation with a gender dimension. Parity is now only one of the 
HCEfh’s 5 missions (along with gender stereotypes, international, health and reproductive rights and 
gender violence). This could mean that parity has been diluted and downgraded on the political 
agenda. However, recent developments that I detail in the next section points to another interpretation, 
that is that parity has been fully adopted as the new way to frame equality issue and as the preferred 
mechanism to address many gender inequalities by state feminism institutions.  
Extending parity: quotas for boards and beyond 
Once deemed un-French and a European or American import, parity and quotas mechanisms have 
become quintessentially French. The parity motto emerged as French feminist activists networked at 
the European level and produced expertise on women’s in decision-making that proved to be crucial in 
their national crusade. This typical boomerang effect (Keck and Sikkink 1998) characterized the early 
1990s and the emergence of the parity claim but did not last beyond this first phase. Instead, the parity 
claim and the idea of gender quotas as tools to reach equality developed, thanks to the institutional 
support structure, and generated new venues and new advances, without any references to 
international or European incentives.  
Indeed, the story of the demand for corporate boards quotas, and their later adoption in 2011, and the 
subsequent rapid diffusion of gender quotas as a redress mechanisms in various domains such as the 
French state bureaucracy, universities, professional organizations and so on is evidence of the 
indigenization of gender quotas. The process by which corporate board quotas (CBQ) were adopted 
differs clearly from the adoption of political parity. Indeed, the then General Rapporteure of the 
Observatory of Parity and of the National Assembly’s delegation for women’s rights, Marie-Jo 
Zimmermann, heard of the Norwegian CBQ law of 2003 and decided to pay a visit to its main 
instigator in Norway as part of her mandate as head of the Observatory. Asides from this one-day 
fieldtrip abroad, the whole process of adoption of CBQ is typically French and does not involve any 
reference to European or international soft law or incentive. 
Q: Did you benefit from any European influence ? 
M-J Z: No, absolutely not. I had as my ambition that France should be the model.  
The 2008 Constitutional revision planned by President Sarkozy to modernize political institutions gave 
Marie-Jo Zimmermann the window of opportunity she was looking for. Advised by an important 
figure of her own party, Simone Veil
27
 who was then in charge of making propositions to the President 
Sarkozy to revise the Constitution, that she should seize the opportunity of the reform, despite 
Sarkozy’s opposition, Marie-Jo Zimmermann proposed an amendment to Article 3 to enlarge the 
constitutional commitment to promoting women’s equal access to electoral mandate to ‘professional 
functions’. However the fight was not so easy to win. Indeed, she was going against her own political 
party since the President has decided he did not want any Constitutional revision on the CBQ issue 
and wanted rather to add a provision on gender equality in the Preamble of the constitution (therefore 
with no binding effect).  
The battle for the constitutional revision, in order to add professional responsibilities to ‘electoral 
mandates’ and ‘elective functions’ to Article 3 of the Constitution, the very one changed in 1999 in 
order to allow gender quotas in politics, repeated the arguments already rehearsed in 1999 but on a 
minor mode. Opposition was now concentrated in the right wing Senate and Marie-Jo Zimmermann, 
who was witnessing the senate debate from the public gallery kept the journalists informed. Using a 
‘shaming’ tactic and with the press on her side she pressured senators to vote her amendment, helped 
by the parity leader at the Assembly, Jean François Coppé. The main fight then occurred between 
                                                     
27 Famously known for defending the law decriminalizing abortion in France, the « loi Veil » of 1975. 
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Marie-Jo Zimmermann and her right wing colleague Rachida Dati, then minister of Justice and 
mandated by the President Sarkozy to prevent the revision allowing CBQ.
28
 
Arguments against the CBQ reform repeated what the Constitutional Council had tried to impose prior 
to the parity constitutional reform, i.e. that parity was contrary to the constitutional principle of 
equality, although on a minor mode compared to 1999. For example a (female) senator stated in the 
2008 debates: 
Should the Constitution go as far as stating the principle of parity in the professional and social 
sphere? I repeat myself, I do not think so. The principle of equality already exists. Women, 
individually, must seize it. As Guy Carcassonne [a famous constitutional legal scholar] said ‘only 
individuals are bearers of equal rights, the Republic ignores groups that, by their nature, would 
introduce discrimination’.29  
However, in 2008, this type of counter-argument to refuse quota in the name of a formal and 
individualist conception of equality opposed to any special treatment for any groups was not supported 
by a majority. In 2008, the idea of compulsory measures with specific targets, although still raising 
some objections, was much more legitimate than a decade earlier. 
The successful, and more consensual, constitutional revision led the way to the 2011 law ‘Coppé-
Zimmermann’ implementing a two-step quota of 20% by 2014 and 40% by 2017 for board members of 
publicly listed companies, as well as unlisted companies which have more than 500 workers and 
average revenues or total assets of more than 50 million euros during the last three consecutive years. 
It also applies to some state owned companies.
30
 The sanction is quite direct since boards members 
appointments while not respected the quota are considered null and board members benefit can be 
suspended. As Marie-Jo Zimmermann recalls
31
 she came back from Norway and decided she needed 
to convince one of her party main stakeholder, Jean-François Coppé, then president of the UMP group 
at the national Assembly. In order to take him on board, and aware of his competitive attitude towards 
Germany, she assured him that CBQ were discussed in Germany and that Angela Merkel might do the 
first move. 
Although the debate on CBQ existed in other European country at the time (Oliveira and Gondek 
2014) the inspiration for the bill and the process to adopt it are devoid of European influence. Rather, 
an internal dynamic, driven by the support structure created with the parity laws, unfold successfully 
as women’s absence from decision making bodies appeared more and more illegitimate, and the 
political elite familiarized itself with the idea of using gender quotas. No direct reference to European 
incentives or norms can be found during the parliamentary debates or in parliamentary reports, only 
one reference in passing to Norway and Spain.  
Moreover, there was no social mobilization or feminist activism around this issue. After the law 
passed organizations of women’s accountants or women’s board members (such as the AFECA32) 
developed and launched networking initiatives with academics in business schools and training for 
women’s boards members, there was no mobilization of any kind of collective actor prior to the law. 
As Marie-Jo Zimmermann notes: 
The Norwegian union of employers feared that now they would have to train adminsitrators. I told 
them: when you’re a man you are born and administrator, a woman has to become one. So it helped 
                                                     
28 Interview of Marie-Jo Zimmermann with the author. 11 June 2014. 
29 Muguette Dini (UDI right wing party), Senate debates, 18 June 2008, p. 2926. 
30 I detail below in section 3 the implementation of this law. 
31 Interview with the author. 11 June 2014. 
32 Association des femmes diplômées expertise comptable et administrateurs. 
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reform the role of the administrator. Until then nobody asked the question of competences (…) but 
what are the criteria ? so it helped professionalized the function. 
Hence, the CBQ law, contrary to the parity laws, is a top-down process, in great part made possible by 
the support structure created as a response to the political activism of the 1990s for political parity.  
The process of diffusing gender quotas to other spheres than politics and using them as the preferred 
tool to reach gender equality continued as a year later a law, called “loi Sauvadet” was passed to 
impose a 40% gender quotas to the higher public service functions to be reached by 2018. This quota 
applies to administrative and supervisory boards of public institutions, high councils, jurys and 
selection committee in public service procedures.
33
  
The institutionalization of a support structure, with missions to deliver impact studies and to evaluate 
bills that are under scrutiny in the Parliament also allows femocrats to mainstream gender quotas in 
other domains. For example, in 2013 the law reforming higher education also included provisions to 
promote parity in university decision-making bodies and representative bodies.
34
 The last round of 
indigenization and mainstreaming of gender quotas can be seen in the 2014 gender equality law, 
passed on July 23
rd
 2014. Indeed, the impact study, written by the HCEfh prior to parliamentary 
discussions on the bill,
35
 devotes a whole section to ‘Generalizing the constitutional objective of 
parity’. The law itself follows these incentives and addresses domains where parity should be 
implemented (or better implemented) in politics, such as legislative elections but also inter-communal 
structures, but also, and mainly, outside politics in the public domain (the EPICs a legal entity that 
structures many territorial public institutions), chambers of commerce agriculture and industry, as well 
as the private domain such as sports organizations. Finally, the HCEfh’s opinion on the 2014 equality 
bill identifies many domains to which quotas and the “parity principle” should be applied in the future, 
such as unions, NGOs, and political parties. Hence, virtually every public or professional organization 
has become the object of scrutiny of the HCEfh and the Women’s rights ministry in order to apply 
parity, which now in fact means most of the time a 40% gender quota. 
Narratives of Equality, Discrimination, Democracy and Governance 
Despite its staunch opposition, the CC lost the battle against quotas. What is more, the CC’s reasoning 
encouraged parity activists in the 1990s to define gender as a specific difference, different from other 
social differences such as ethnicity or language (Bereni and Lépinard 2004, Scott 2005, Lépinard 
2013). To do so they argued that sex was a more universal difference than any other social difference 
and therefore could be legally recognized without endangering constitutional republican principles (or 
granting other groups similar rights to representation). This argument opened the door to framing 
parity as a ‘principle’ (rather than a tool) and to using parity (therefore at least 40%) instead of smaller 
quotas, as the recent reports and recommendations issued by the HCEfh testify. To bolster their claims 
parity activists argued that parity would also improve democracy and modernize political institutions. 
(Lépinard 2007). The idea that an equal share of men and women would lead to a better democratic 
government was often linked with the idea of a complementarity between men’s and women’s 
perspectives. Flirting with essentialism (and sometimes embracing it), parity activists put forth 
women’s different social experience in order to legitimize their participation in political decision-
making. However, these strategic arguments, although important in the 1999-2000 parliamentary 
debates, did not lead to major legal or normative shifts with respect to the conception of democracy or 
citizenship. Indeed, the 1999 constitutional revision clearly avoided any reference to parity as a 
                                                     
33 Loi n°2012-347 of 12 March 2012. 
34 Loi n° 2013-660 of 22 July 2013 relative à l'enseignement supérieur et à la recherché. 
35 ETUDE D'IMPACT, NOR : DFEX1313602L/Bleue-1, 1er July 2014. 
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constitutional principle, preferring to refer to ‘equal access’, thereby staying safely within the confines 
of equal opportunity rather than substantive equality or parity. 
In 2013 a minor shift appeared as the term parity was, for the first time included in the body of a legal 
text (and not in the exposé des motifs of the bill, i.e. the political rationale that precedes the legal text 
itself). The 2013 law on higher education mentions explicitly in several of its provisions the word 
parity. The same goes for the 2014 equality law since one of its titles reads “applying the 
constitutional principle of parity”. This trend mirrors the political will of the HCEfh to see the parity 
principle more clearly defined and identified as a principle of equal sharing of power and of 
representation between men and women. Interestingly the HCEfh proposes a genealogy of the parity 
principle that ties together the international incentives for positive action with the republican 
universalist tradition: 
Hence, the principle of non-discrimination, which implies that women are entitled to half of the seats 
of the representatives since they are half of the population, is articulated with a justification of 
women’s presence in the name of the experiences, and specific interests they bring, whether these 
are presented as resulting from biology or as socially constructed (…) 
Quotas are legal and legitimate in the name of a coherent republican universalism. Quotas are not 
preferential measures but corrective and transformative measures that aims at undoing structural 
barriers which are incompatible with the principle of equality.
36
 
With this consensual narrative, mixing together all the arguments generally mobilized in favor of 
quotas and defining quota mechanisms and parity as, in fact, complementary and ‘republican’, the 
HCEfh attempts at making parity a ‘common referential principle identifiable by all actors and adapted 
for each sector [of social and economic life]’.37  
However, parliamentary debates show that mostly pragmatic arguments are used by quota proponents 
to argue their case and that they rarely refer to parity as a principle. Only Catherine Génisson, a 
socialist deputy and former General Rapporteure of the Observatory for Parity reminds her colleagues 
when discussing CBQ in 2010 that 
[y]ou have chosen the principle of quotas to ensure women’s representativity in companies’ boards. 
This is an questionable choice because women are half of humanity. Hence the principle of parity 
should apply, not quotas.
38
 
Her fellow deputies use the term parity to refer to zipper lists of candidates for boards or to political 
parity, in a way that does not underline any difference with a quota. Arguments about democracy and 
governance are minimal when it comes to CBQ. Proponents argue that CBQ will introduce a diversity 
of perspective and thereby also improve the governance of companies: 
In the future, with more women in the executive board and governance bodies of big firms, this 
integration will bring a global added value for the functioning of companies. In fact, with more 
women, governance is not worst or better, but women’s perspective in decision making bodies 
represents an added-value for society’ projects.39 
But overall arguments on democracy and governance did not figure prominently in the CBQ debate 
recent parliamentary debates. Rather equal pay, gender equality at work and discrimination were much 
more present when parliamentarians discussed the CBQ. In a similar vein, in the following debates on 
                                                     
36 Haut Conseil à l’Egalité entre les femmes et les hommes, Avis sur le projet de loi pour l’égalité entre les femmes et les 
hommes, Avis n°2013-0912-HCE-007, p. 49. 
37 Ibid, p. 51. 
38 National Assembly, 20 January 2010, p. 246. 
39 Chantal Bourragué (UMP), National Assembly, 20 January 2010, p. 250. 
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gender quotas, in 2013 and 2014, pragmatic arguments about women’s representation and gender 
equality were mostly used by politicians. Hence the diffusion of gender quotas in many spheres of 
social life did not lead to a reformulation of the principle of equality or to the adoption of parity as a 
legal concept. Indeed, all of the pieces of legislation using gender quotas passed between 1999 and 
2013 referred to ‘women and men’s equal access’ to decision making bodies, to ‘women’s access to 
deliberative bodies’ or to a ‘balanced representation of women and men in corporate boards’. Hence, 
although there are no clear references to European incentives or norms, the very vocabulary forged by 
the European commission at the beginning of the 1990s, one of ‘balanced representation’ is a 
privileged way to refer to quota measures.
40
 As mentioned before, only the 2013 piece of legislation 
on higher education and the 2014 equality bill mention the term parity in the title of some of their 
provisions (without defining it whatsoever).  
Also in line with the European development of anti-discrimination measures in the 2000s is the 
growing insistence, during parliamentary debate, on the role of gender quotas as tool to redress 
discrimination and to achieve substantive equality. For example, a female senator in favor of the 2008 
constitutional revision stated during the parliamentary debates:  
We propose to establish a positive obligation to guarantee equality between men and women. In fact, 
in this domain, it is not about an obligation to give the proper means, it is about an obligation to 
achieve results.
41
 
Similarly, the recent equality bill passed in July 2014 is presented by the HCEfh as a bill to achieve 
‘real equality’ between men and women, as opposed to formal equality and equal opportunity.42 
Hence, as quotas become routinized tools to promote women’s access to executive functions and 
decision-making bodies from which they were previously excluded, arguments to support them tend to 
become more pragmatic, practical and rely mostly on an anti-discrimination rationale. Proponents of 
quotas points to gap, inequalities, absence of natural progress rather than developing normative 
arguments about citizenship, governance or democracy. Finally, in the French case, despite its 
successful diffusion to various spheres of social life, the quota mechanism has not led to legal 
reformulation of the equality principle at the constitutional level. Although the various laws and the 
legislative debates refer to the need for effectiveness, and the use of quotas is therefore clearly a means 
to achieve greater substantive equality, the French legal doctrine has not been altered beyond what 
European non-discrimination legal norms require. Although the current French legislation probably 
goes beyond what the European jurisprudence on positive action has sanctioned as legally acceptable 
(Oliveira and Gondek 2014) this incremental shift towards the generalization of compulsory gender 
quotas and a substantive conception of equality has happened in a piecemeal bureaucratic fashion, 
driven by the institutional support structure created with the parity laws, and without frontally 
challenging dominant legal definitions of equality. 
Gender Quotas: a Tool for what Kind of Toolbox? 
Gender quotas have become the preferred tool to ensure women’s access to ‘boys clubs’ in business, 
public service, universities, sports or professional organizations. Parity activists claimed in the 1990s 
that parity was a new form of equality, a perfect type of equality because it was numerical numerical 
                                                     
40 On the contrary, the European/Onusian lingo that refers to quota as ‘temporary special measures’ is totally absent from the 
French legal debate. 
41 ‘Nous proposons d’instaurer une obligation positive d’assurer l’égalité entre les hommes et les femmes. En fait, dans ce 
domaine, il s’agit non pas d’une obligation de moyens, mais d’une obligation de résultat’, Alima Boumediene-Thierry 
(socialist party), Senate Debate, 18 June 2008, p. 2927. 
42 As stated in the Governement’s press release about the bill (1 July 2014), the bill aims at ‘ensuring the concrete 
effectiveness of women’s rights already guaranteed by existing laws, for example with respect to égalité  professionnelle 
or political parity’. 
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equality (Lépinard 2007). They were opposed to the idea of quotas because only a perfectly equal 
presence of women and men means could, concretely, realize and embody gender equality. The idea 
that gender equality is achieved when gender equal presence is reached is very seducing, but can 
gender equality be equated with equal presence of both sexes? Gender quotas are indeed a potent tool 
to achieve gender equal presence, especially in traditionally male bastions, but equal presence does 
not imply equal power in the decision making process, it does not ensure that decisions are ‘women 
friendly’ and it may not challenge the public/private divide upon which deeply entrenched structures 
of gender inequality rests. Hence, there is a need to assess both what quotas can achieve and their 
limits with respect to their stated goal, i.e. gender equality (and the meaning of this term). This section 
first evaluates quotas’ effectiveness in reaching their goals of improving women’s access to decision 
making and representative bodies in the French context, then it looks at the type of complementary 
measures that have been put in place in the French context to overcome gender quotas inherent limits. 
The Reasons for Success? Sanctions, Sanctions, Sanctions 
Success in quotas’ implementation in the French context clearly varies depending on the nature and 
degree of sanctions for non-compliance. Were quotas are compulsory… they work very well. Where 
they can be by-passed… they often are. Thanks to the gradual improvement of political gender quotas 
laws women have massively enter many political assemblies, except for the national legislature and 
new executive structures created at the local level. While the latter gender gap in EPCIs
43
 will be 
partially remedied by the recent 2013 electoral law
44
, the national legislature, especially the National 
Assembly, remains a male stronghold despite incremental positive change, especially when left wing 
parties win elections. 
Indeed, although the financial sanctions were gradually increased (in 2000 they represented a loss of 
50% of the gender gap on the first fraction of public party financing for MP’s elections, in 2007 this 
percentage was raised to 75%, and in 2014 it was raised to 150%), the main right wing political parties 
remain reluctant to recruit women and to present them in winnable circumscriptions. The right wing 
UMP lost around 20 million Euros due to its non-compliance with parity in candidacies in the 2012 
legislative elections. In 2012 there were slightly less female candidates (40%) than the previous 
legislative elections in 2007 (41.6%) but, thanks to the victory of left wing parties, the percentage of 
female deputies rose from 18.5% in 2007 to 26.9% in 2012.
45
 The 2012 National Assembly comprise 
155 female MPs, out of which 125 (80.6%) belong to left wing parties.  
2012 legislative elections 
 % female candidates % women elected 
Left wing parties 44.8 36.7 
Right wing parties 38.4 12.8 
Source: Observatoire de la parité 
                                                     
43 Etablissements publics de coopération intercommunale are legal structures by which cities located nearby each other group 
together to pool together their resources. Town councilors are (designated by the mayor and) elected by their peers to this 
intercommunal assembly. Many important decisions regarding urbanism, construction, infrastructures etc. are now taken 
in these assemblies. In 2009 only 7.2% women presided these important local political institutions. 
44 Loi n° 2013-403 of 17 May 2013 relative à l'élection des conseillers départementaux, des conseillers municipaux et des 
conseillers communautaire – will implement parity on candidate lists for local town councils in cities over 1000 
inhabitants and will directly designate those who will participate in the EPCIs (placed on the first positions on the list), 
thereby transfering a parity effect to the EPCIs. 
45 France ranks 13th among the 28 European countries for women’s representation in the lower chamber. 
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For local elections parity was also gradually improved. In 2007 a law applied parity to regional and 
municipal councils’ executives (for cities over 3500 inhabitants).46 In 2008 a law imposed that 
substitutes of General councilors (elected with a uninominal majoritarian system) should not be of the 
same gender than the councilor.
47
 In 2013 a law improved parity, applying it to municipal elections in 
cities over 1000 inhabitants (by introducing a closed list proportional system), as well as to EPCIs and 
introduced the mix-ticket (one man/one woman) for general councilors’ elections.48 
Percentage of women in political assemblies and executives 
(highlighted in grey: a parity measure applied to the given election.) 
 Election year % of women 
Senate 2011 22.1 
National Assembly 2012 26.9 
Regional Councils 2010 48 
Regional Councils’ presidencies 2010 7.7 
Regional Councils’ executives 2010 45.5 
General Councils (départements) 2011 13.9 
General Councils’ presidencies 2011 5 
Municipal elections 2008 35 
Cities over 3500 h. 2008 48.5 
Cities under 3500 h 2008 32.2 
Mayors 2008 13.8 
Source: Observatoire de la parité 2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012  
The dynamics for political parity clearly shows an incremental path, with several laws passed to 
improve parity measures (and a few setbacks under Sarkozy right wing majority) and an expansion of 
the scope of application to executives and to assemblies that are not directly elected by citizens, such 
as EPCIs. However, whereas the uninominal system of election was finally amended to allow for 
parity to be applied at the level of the départements (local discricts) with a mix ticked introduced and a 
coupling of circumscriptions that divided their numbers in two, such reforms have been proposed by 
parity activists for the lower chamber since the beginning of the 1990s but have not find their ways to 
the political agenda. 
 CBQ and quotas in the executive functions of public service confirm that coercion is the best way to 
implement quotas in the French context. Indeed, contrary to what CBQ opponents claimed, i.e. that it 
would not be possible to find competent women to sit on boards, companies to which the law applied. 
Companies with more than 1 billion euros in capital (“compartiment A”) have nominated in 2014 56% 
women, to reach a total number of 30% women sitting on boards (more than what was expected by the 
law) and companies with more than 150 million euros in capital (“compartiment B”) have nominated 
in 2014 68% to reach a total percentage of 24.9% of women sitting on their boards.
49
  
                                                     
46 Loi n° 2007-128 of 31 janvier 2007 tendant à promouvoir l’égal accès des femmes et des hommes aux mandats électoraux 
et fonctions électives. 
47 Loi n° 2008-175 of 26 février 2008 facilitant l’égal accès des femmes et des hommes au mandat de conseiller general.  
48 Loi n° 2013-403 of 17 May 2013. 
49 Data from Observatoire de la parité dans les conseils d’administration, chair in governance, Burgundy Business School. 
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Similarly, the implementation of the ‘loi Sauvadet’, imposing a gender quota to reach for nomination 
to executive functions in public service, has proven very successful. The gender gap was particularly 
stark in public service with 59.8% women in the public service workforce and 21% women in 
managing positions (in 2009). Following the Coppé-Zimmermann law and several protocols and 
Charters against discrimination signed by the governmental administration
50
, gender quotas were again 
considered as the only tool to remedy the situation. The law that was passed imposed a 40% quota 
within a 5 years framework (2013-2018).
51
 Here again the first results have proven very positive and 
the argument of the absence of a pool of women to candidate to high public service functions was 
contradicted by the facts. Although numbers are not collected systematically yet, interviews suggest 
that the target will probably be met before 2018 in many administrative branches.  
Articulating Quotas with Gender Equality 
During the debate on CBQ many parliamentarians linked the quota mechanism with a broader gender 
equality agenda in the workforce: 
To impose that boards and representative bodies in companies, a world exclusively masculine, not to 
say chauvinist, be ‘invaded’ by women will enable to change women’s situation in firms, and, may 
be, to actually apply our law on égalité professionnelle, at last! 52 
In particular women’s representation was presented as a tool to increase gender equality, both by left-
wing and right-wing deputies: 
It is crucial to talk about men and women’s representation in the political, the professional, the 
social spheres if we want to promote equality between men and women in all spheres of social life.
53
  
The other fight we must fight is against unequal pays between men and women for similar functions. 
This inequality is an absolute scandal. It is inside corporate boards (…) that strategies about 
remuneration are defined (…) it is therefore in corporate boards that newly arrived female 
administrators will have as their mission to put this debate on the table.
54
 
Hence, an underlying idea, that runs through the parity debate since its inception in the political realm, 
is that women’s presence in decision making bodies will trickle down to impact favorably gender 
equality in the workforce in general, a domain in which, despite many legislative efforts, few progress 
has been made in France. Thus, if quotas have become the preferred tool to remedy the gender gap in 
political, economic and administrative functions, femocrats and feminist politicians are aware that they 
cannot solve all problems. Whereas with the 2000 parity law the piece of legislation was entirely 
devoted to the implementation gender quotas in politics, now quotas are only one measure among 
others in gender equality legislations.  
Particularly interesting in the French case is the dynamic of coupling the implementation of gender 
quota with a gender assessment of the organization to which it applies. Indeed, for example in the 
CBQ 2011 law the 40% target is coupled with the obligation that the administrative and/or the 
supervisory board discuss annually about the company’s policy for égalité professionnelle. In 
companies that already submit an annual report comparing women’s and men’s situation at work and 
                                                     
50 Françoise Guéguot, L’égalité professionnelle hommes-femmes dans la fonction publique, rapport au Président de la 
République, Assemblée Nationale, 2011. 
51 Loi n° 2012-347 of 12 March 2012. 
52 Pascale Crozon (PS), National Assembly, 27 May 2008, p. 2553. 
53 Catherine Génisson (PS) National Assembly, 27 May 2008, p. 2554. 
54 Jean-François Coppé (UMP) National Assembly, 20 January 2010, p. 256. 
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for training inside the company, the boards must now also discuss annually the content of the report.
55
 
Nominations of women and in the whole company. The law also imposes the state itself to survey and 
assess the situation of women on administrative and supervisory boards in the companies and 
institutions it supervises. Before the end of the year 2015 the government must hand in a report to the 
Parliament detailing the progresses made in terms of nominations on boards.
56
 The idea is of course 
clearly to use women’s presence on boards to push for stronger gender equality measures in the whole 
firm: 
The day when boards with 40% women will discuss égalité professionnelle on the basis of the 
comparative report on men and women’s situations in the firm, the six laws on gender equality at 
work that we have passed will maybe finally be respected. To target corporations’ governance must 
give a new impetus to gender equality at work.
57
 
Similarly in the 2014 equality law, new provisions were introduced to impose to territorial assemblies 
(regional councils, cities and EPCIs over 20 000 inhabitants, general councils) to hand in each year a 
report on gender equality in the region or city, comparing men and women’s situation and how public 
policy implemented by the city or the council impact men and women and the program that the city or 
council can put in place to remedy the situation. Hence, each year, before discussing the annual 
budget, these political entities will have to think about gender equality policies they should implement. 
Gender quotas therefore opened the door to the implementation of a form of gender mainstreaming at 
the local level. They also generalize the practice of counting and measuring gender inequalities for all 
type of social or economic activity.  
However, will these additional measures prove efficient in bringing social change and transforming 
gender relations? It is too early to assess CBQ’s impact on the implementation of gender equality in 
the workforce thanks to the mechanisms embedded in the law. This assessment will nonetheless be 
very important in the French context. Indeed, many pieces of legislation have been passed since the 
first law on égalité professionnelle in 1983 (Mazur 2001), with incredibly weak results. The laws have 
mostly used incentives: equality labels were set up, annual reports were asked, charters were signed 
among social partners etc. with a steady gender gap in pay over the decades, despite women’s 
increased participation in higher education. It will therefore be interesting to see if gender quotas on 
boards can indeed impulse a new dynamic in this area. 
Conclusion 
As a conclusion, I summarize here the French case with respect to the four set of questions proposed 
for this comparative project. 
Domestic / National Preconditions for Gender Quotas 
In France gender quotas initiatives present various dynamics. The 1999-2000 reform was clearly the 
product of a wide mobilization, allying feminist and women’s organizations that had not previously 
been allied in any type of coalition. Left wing female politicians were instrumental in the activism in 
favor of the law, but some key actors were also female right wing politicians (although in smaller 
numbers). The institutionalization of parity with various bureaucratic structures enabled the 
indigenization of gender quotas and the routinization of the claim. Again left wing female and male 
politicians were mostly in favor of the subsequent quota laws, but right wing female politician, Marie-
Jo Zimmermann was a key actor in the top-down process to pass CBQ. As quotas become a routinized 
                                                     
55 Loi n° 2011-103 of 27 January 2011, article 8. 
56 Loi n° 2011-103, article 7. 
57 Marie-Jo Zimmermann (UMP) National Assembly, 20 January 2010, p. 239. 
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tool the left/right divide on this issue has tended to fade with consensus growing (with the usual 
political battles between majority and minority when discussing bills). Resistance used to be clearly 
located on the right wing of the Parliament in the 1990s and was attempted by representatives of 
employers for CBQ but is now non-existent, especially for CBQ: the business sector has complied and 
has totally adopted the gender quota requirement and the diversity narrative, underlining that it will 
improve boards’ performances. 
Transnational Factors 
While the political parity was clearly the result of a transnational networking (organized by the 
European Commission and the Council of Europe), subsequent gender quotas reforms are mostly 
endogenous to the French context with very few references to European processes (although Vivianne 
Reding’s position on CBQ was shaping up as the French Parliament was discussing the issue). 
The Legal and Constitutional Challenge 
Whereas political parity was discussed on normative and constitutional grounds, and despite the CC 
strong reluctance in extending quotas schemes, the legislator finally overcame these constitutional 
obstacles, but it took two rounds of constitutional revision. Hence constitutional obstacles clearly 
delayed the process of adoption of quotas and forced parity activists to argue on highly normative 
grounds to demonstrate the compatibility of parity with republican principles. A decade and a half 
after parity has not been translated into a new legal principle, and despite recent efforts by the HCEfh 
it seems that gender quotas are now conceived rather as a pragmatic tool to reach gender equality 
goals, without strong references to parity as a normative principle or any kind of redefinition of 
governance or citizenship. However, certainly the popular conception of democracy has been altered: 
women’s absence from decision-making bodies is now clearly perceived as a problem.  
However, the legitimization of parity has not trickle down for other groups. There has been (almost) 
no discussion on ethnic minorities’ absence from politics or from boards. The issue of diversity in the 
workforce has been on the agenda, but in a parallel process driven by European directives on anti-
discrimination. The diffusion of gender quotas to almost all social spheres of activity has not led to 
similar legal developments for ethnic minorities or other groups (Lépinard 2013).  
New Frontiers 
Quotas have been extended to almost all decision-making bodies. Only unions and NGOs have not 
been put under the legislator’s scrutiny. The 2014 comprehensive bill on equality is a good illustration 
of how quotas are now a preferred tool in the French toolkit for gender equality: It extends quotas in 
the economic sphere (professional organizations), the social sphere (sport federations) and strengthen 
quotas in the political sphere (higher fines for non-compliance for legislative elections). However, the 
law also proposes a reform of parental leave, measures to combat violence against women and 
stereotypes in media, therefore proposing a comprehensive approach to gender equality in which 
quotas are not separate from other types of policy measures.  
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